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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL \ 
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIA- \ 
TION, a corporation, I 
Plaintiff and Respondent, I 
vs. > Case No. 8720 
HARTFORD ACCIDENT & I 
INDEMNITY COMPANY, \ 
a corporation, I 
Defendant and Appellant. I 
BRIEF OF PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS 
& LOAN ASSOCIATION, RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent adopts generally Appellant's state-
ment of facts, but must add certain omitted matters. 
This case was consolidated for trial with two other 
cases likewise involving suits against Hartford Ac-
cident & Indemnity Company and all arising out of 
the same Contract Bond (Ex. Pr-1) which reads as 
follows, (Appellant quoted only certain portions): 
l 
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"KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRE-
SENTS: 
That We, CASSADY COMPANY, Inc., 
a Utah corporation, and C. P. CASSADY of 
Arcadia, California, (hereinafter called the 
PRINCIPAL) and HARTFORD ACCIDENT 
AND INDEMNITY COMPANY, a corpora-
tion, with its principal office in Hartford, 
Connecticut, and authorized to transact sur-
ety business in the State of Utah, (hereinafter 
called the SURETY) are held and firmly-
bound and obligated unto PRUDENTIAL 
FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSO-
CIATION, a corporation of the United States 
of America, (hereinafter called LENDER 
OBLIGEE) and unto FELT SYNDICATE, 
a corporation of the State of Utah, (herein-
after called the OWNER OBLIGEE), and 
unto PACIFIC COAST TITLE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a corporation of the State of 
Utah (hereinafter called TITLE OBLIGEE), 
as their respective interests may appear as 
obligees in the sum of SEVEN HUNDRED 
SIXTY THREE THOUSAND AND NO/100 
($763,000.00) DOLLARS lawful money of 
the United. States of America, for the payment 
of which PRINCIPAL AND SURETY bind 
themselves, their heirs, executors, administra-
tors, successors, and assigns, jointly and sev-
erally, firmly by these presents. 
WHEREAS, the PRINCIPAL has en-
tered into a contract with the OWNER OB-
LIGEE for the construction of dwelling 
houses and appurtenant improvements in a 
housing project known and designated as 
Morningside Heights Subdivision, located in 
Salt Lake County, Utah, which contract is by 
2 
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reference incorporated herein and made a part 
hereof; and 
WHEREAS, the LENDER OBLIGEE 
has agreed to lend to each qualified borrower, 
upon the security of a first lien mortgage, a 
sum of money to be used in the construction 
of a dwelling house and appurtenant improve-
ments upon a lot in said housing project own-
ed by the borrower; and 
WHEREAS, the funds loaned by the 
LENDER OBLIGEE on the security of said 
first lien mortgage will be used with the con-
sent of the borrower in making payments due 
the PRINCIPAL under said contract; and 
WHEREAS, the TITLE OBLIGEE will 
issue ATA title insurance policies on each lot 
or parcel of real estate upon which the LEN-
DER OBLIGEE makes a mortgage loan as 
herein stated; and 
WHEREAS, the LENDER OBLIGEE, 
TITLE OBLIGEE, and OWNER OBLIGEE 
each desire protection as their interests may 
appear, in event of default by the PRINCI-
PAL under said contract, said protection to 
be subject to the performance by the LEN-
DER OBLIGEE, the TITLE OBLIGEE, and 
the OWNER OBLIGEE of their respective 
obligations to the PRINCIPAL in connection 
with said contract; 
NOW, THEREFORE, the condition of 
this obligation is such that if the PRINCIPAL 
well and truly performs all the undertakings, 
covenants, conditions and agreements of said 
contract on its part and fully indemnifies 
and saves harmless the obligees from all loss, 
3 
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cost, damage, and expense which they may 
suffer, either jointly and severally, by reason 
of failure so to do, and fully reimburses and 
repays obligees all outlay and expense which 
said obligees may incur in making good any 
such default; and, further, if the PRINCI-
PAL shall pay all persons who have contract-
ed, or will have contracted, directly with 
PRINCIPAL for services or labor or materi-
als furnished under the provisions of said 
contract, and shall keep and maintain each 
lot or building-site free and clear of labor and 
material liens, then this obligation shall be 
void; otherwise, it shall remain in full force 
and effect. 
The foregoing, however, is subject to the 
following provisions: 
1. The LENDER OBLIGEE shall have 
prior right and lien under this Bond as against 
the other Obligees herein named. 
2. The SURETY and PRINCIPAL 
agree that, in the event the PRINCIPAL shall 
default in the performance of the undertak-
ings, covenants, terms, conditions, and agree-
ments of said contract on its part, the SUR-
ETY will have the option to cure and remedy 
said default and complete performance of said 
contract. 
3. The SURETY shall not be liable un-
der this Bond to the Obligees, and either of 
them, unless the Obligees, or either of them, 
shall make payment to the PRINCIPAL in 
reasonable compliance with the terms of said 
contract as to payments, and each shall per-
form all other obligations to be performed by 
4 
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each Obligee under said contract at the time 
and in the manner therein set forth. 
4. The SURETY agrees that any right 
of action or claim that either of the Obligees 
herein might have under this Bond may be 
subordinated to the other, and that such sub-
ordination will in no manner invalidate or 
qualify this Bond. The SURETY further 
agrees to recognize any such agreement of 
subordination and priority upon being fur-
nished with signed evidence thereof. 
5. No suit, action, or proceeding by rea-
son of any default, whatever, shall be brought 
on this Bond after two (2) years from the 
date on which the final payment under the 
contract falls due, provided, however, that in 
the event there exists or is pending any collat-
eral litigation which has the effect of making 
it impossible for any Obligee under this Bond 
to determine its rights hereunder, a suit, ac-
tion, or other proceeding under this Bond may 
be instituted within six (6) months after 
entry of final judgment in said collateral 
litigation. 
6. The prior written approval of SUR-
ETY shall be required with regard to any 
changes or alterations in said contract where 
the cost thereof, added to prior changes or 
alterations, causes the aggregate cost of all 
changes and alterations to exceed 10 per cent 
of the original contract price; but, except as 
to the foregoing, any alterations which may 
be made in the terms of the contract, or in the 
work to be done under it, or the giving by the 
Obligees of any extensions of time for the 
performance of the contract, or any other 
forbearance on the part of either the Obligees 
5 
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or PRINCIPAL to the other, shall not in any 
way release SURETY or PRINCIPAL of the 
obligations of this instrument, notice of SUR-
ETY of any such alterations, extensions, or 
forbearance being hereby waived. 
7. The aggregate liability of SURETY 
hereunder to the Obligees or their assigns is 
limited to the penal sum above stated, and 
SURETY, upon making any payment here-
under shall be subrogated to, and shall be en-
titled to an assignment of, all rights of the 
payee, either against PRINCIPAL or against 
any other party liable to the payee in con-
nection with the loss which is the subject of 
the payment. 
SIGNED, SEALED AND DATED 
21st day of July, 1950. 
PREMIUM ON THIS 
BOND IS $7,630.00 
CASSADY COMPANY, INC 
By / s / C. P. Cassady 
/ s / C. P. Cassady 
HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND 
INDEMNITY COMPANY 
By / s / A. L. Blackburn 
Attorney-in-Fact" 
All parties knew that the financing program 
was such that individual loans were to be made to 
veteran purchasers of the lots in Morningside 
Heights and that until and when each lot had been 
sold, a note and mortgage executed, the proposed 
6 
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veteran-borrower approved by the U. S. Veterans 
Administration, the mortgage actually recorded and 
the A-T-A policy of title insurance issued, Pruden-
tial had no right or duty to disburse any funds. 
This same procedure had to be repeated 100 times 
as such was a prerequisite to the disbursing of funds 
on each and all of the 100 separate loans. 
Even as Hartford complains that it's bonded 
contractor, Cassady, had problems on procurement 
of materials because of the outbreak of the Korean 
crisis shortly following the execution of the Con-
tract Bond, so too, the selling of these lots to veter-
ans for future construction of dwellings became 
more difficult in light of the Korean crisis and their 
possible recalling into active duty. 
As shown by Appellant's statement of facts, 
problems arose between Cassady as contractor, the 
suppliers of materials, Felt and Prudential through-
out the last five months of 1950. In compromise 
settlement of such difficulties, the contractor, Cass-
ady which had agreed to complete all 100 houses 
within 180 days from July 19, 1950 (Exh. PR-2), 
sought and received an extension of time for com-
pletion up to June 1st, 1951. This was by "Supple-
mental Agreement" dated February 16, 1951 (Ex. 
PR-6). 
The said compromise settlement of prior diffi-
culties and differences so dated February 16, 1951 
7 
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provided that Prudential was given certain options 
as to disbursement of the funds. The said Supple-
mental Agreement (PR-6) provided in part, 
"D. The balance of the loan proceeds, 
plus and deposited funds and the down pay-
ment, if any, shall be disbursed by PRUDEN-
TIAL from and after the date of this Sup-
plemental Agreement at such time or times, 
in such manner and in such amounts as in 
the sole judgment and discretion of PRU-
DE TIAL is necessary and proper to secure 
the expeditious completion of the aforesaid 
dwelling houses and to assure the payment 
of all subcontractors, materialmen and labor-
ers engaged in work on said project. The de-
cision of PRUDENTIAL as to the time, man-
ner, method and amount of payments shall 
be conclusive and shall be binding upon the 
parties hereto. Notwithstanding the immedi-
ate foregoing provision, PRUDENTIAL is 
hereby authorized and empowered to with-
hold ten per cent (10%) of all loan proceeds 
and down payments and not pay the same 
until the dwelling houses shall have passed 
final inspection by FEDERAL HOUSING 
ADMINISTRATION; VETERANS ADMIN-
ISTRATION or PRUDENTIAL and all qual-
ifications have been met to secure mortgage 
insurance by Federal Housing Administra-
tion or guarantee by Veterans Administra-
tion." 
In partial recognition of the increase of costs 
and in an apparent effort to compromise the claims 
made by Cassady as to Felt's responsibility therefor, 
this Supplemental Agreement of February 16, 1951 
8 
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in paragraph I of Article III increased the price 
per house to be paid to Cassady. The parties also 
confirmed and approved all disbursements of the 
funds paid by Prudential to Associated Accountants 
and then Felt, Cassady and Accountants "hereby 
irrevocably admit that they, and each of them, have 
secured from Prudential an accounting of the pro-
ceeds of all mortgage loans and down payments and 
the disbursal of same by Prudential to the date 
hereof." And then they further, "hereby admit, 
agree and declare that Prudential has performed all 
of its obligations under said Primary Contract and 
Disbursing Contract and supplement thereto dated 
the 22nd day of August 1950, from the respective 
dates thereof to the date of this Supplemental Agree-
ment." 
This said document (PR-6) extending the time 
of completion, establishing new disbursing proce-
dures and discretionary powers in Prudential and 
acknowledging the full accounting by Prudential 
to date, was then signed by all parties. The appel-
lant, as the Surety Company, did not dissent or 
object to the document or the provisions but affixed 
its approval in the following terms "Hartford Ac-
cident and Indemnity Company, as Surety on the 
bond of Cassady Company, Inc. does hereby consent 
to amended paragraphs 22 and 23 and 7 of the con-
struction contract in connection with which its bond 
has been given." 
9 
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It is noted from that February 16,1951 Supple-
mental Agreement, that the changes approved by 
Hartford are: Paragraph 7 which modified the for-
mer contract to extend the time of completion from 
January 19, 1951 to June 1, 1951; paragraph 22 is 
the one increasing the price per house; and para-
graph 23 grants to Prudential discretionary powers 
of disbursement. Those three were the only speci-
fic changes made in the primary construction con-
tract of July 19, 1950; upon which the bond was 
issued, thus there was no occasion for Hartford's 
endorsement in February of 1951 to be any broader. 
As no issue or complaint is made by the appel-
lant as to the amount of the damages, $88,723.85, 
found by the trial Court to have been suffered by 
Prudential, we shall not add any of the many facts 
testified to in support of that judgment. We join 
with Appellant in conceding that such amount was 
properly found and awarded by the trial Court. 
SPECIAL NOTE: 
1. In preparing this brief the term "Pruden-
tial" refers to Prudential Savings & Loan Associa-
tion ; the term "Felt" refers to Felt Syndicate, Inc.; 
the term "Cassady" refers to Cassady Co., Inc. and 
C. P. Cassady; and the term "Pacific" refers to 
Pacific Coast Title Insurance Company. 
2. In referring to the transcript of testimony, 
10 
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the black typed numerals are used instead of the red 
numerals. 
POINTS 
POINT I 
THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
PRUDENTIAL ARE SUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE, 
COMPETENT AND MATERIAL EVIDENCE. 
POINT II 
THIS IS A LAW CASE AND THE FINDINGS OF 
THE TRIAL COURT ARE ENTITLED TO APPROVAL 
BY THE SUPREME COURT IF SUPPORTED BY COM-
PETENT EVIDENCE. 
POINT III 
THE PARTIES TO THE PRIMARY CONSTRUC-
TION CONTRACT AND THE CONTRACT BOND COM-
PROMISED AND SETTLED ANY AND ALL PRIOR 
CLAIMED CONTRACT BREACHES BY THE SUPPLE-
MENTAL AGREEMENT OF FEBRUARY 16, 1951. 
POINT IV 
HARTFORD IS ESTOPPED TO DENY THAT THE 
SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT OF FEBRUARY 16, 
1951 COMPROMISED AND SETTLED PRIOR ALLEG-
ED BREACHES BY FELT AND PRUDENTIAL. 
POINT V 
EXPRESSIONS OF OPINION AS TO THE CON-
STRUCTION OR INTERPRETATION OF A CONTRACT 
BY ONE OF THE PARTIES THERETO AFTER A 
CONTROVERSY HAS ARISEN AS TO THE LIABILITY 
TO IT OF THE OTHER PARTY TO THE CONTRACT 
AND NOT ACTED UPON BY THE OTHER PARTY 
HAVE NO WEIGHT OR RELEVANCY IN INTERPRE-
TING THE CONTRACT. 
11 
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POINT VI 
THE RULE GOVERNING THE INTERPRETATION 
OF CONTRACTS THAT WHERE A CONTRACT BEARS 
MORE THAN ONE REASONABLE MEANING AN IN-
TERPRETATION IS PREFERRED WHICH OPERATES 
MORE STRONGLY AGAINST THE PARTY FROM 
WHOM IT PROCEEDS HAS NO APPLICATION IN 
THIS CASE. HARTFORD'S REPRESENTATIVE CRI-
TICALLY EXAMINED A PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF 
THE BOND MADE BY PRUDENTIAL, ALTERED IT 
SEVERAL RESPECTS; CAUSED THE BOND TO BE 
TYPEWRITTEN IN HIS OWN OFFICE AND FINALLY 
EXECUTED IT ON BEHALF OF HARTFORD. THE 
BOND IS IN LEGAL EFFECT AN INSURANCE CON-
TRACT AND HARTFORD IS A COMPENSATED SUR-
ETY AGAINST WHOM THE BOND WILL BE CON-
STRUED FAVORABLE TO THE OBLIGEES. 
POINT VII 
PRUDENTIAL DID NOT VIOLATE ANY OF ITS 
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS OWING BY IT EITHER 
TO HARTFORD, CASSADY OR FELT SUCH AS WOULD 
BAR ITS RECOVERY OF DAMAGES. 
POINT VIII 
IN ARRIVING AT A CORRECT CONSTRUCTION 
AND INTERPRETATION OF THE BOND, THE COURT 
SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT THE ACTIVITIES OF 
PACIFIC AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THIS CASE 
ARE WHOLLY IMMATERIAL AND IRRELEVANT, 
AND THAT PRUDENTIAL IS A THIRD PARTY BENE-
FICIARY UNDER THE CONTRACT BETWEEN FELT 
AND CASSADY DATED JULY 19, 1950 (EX. PR-2). 
THE COURT SHOULD THEN APPLY CERTAIN WELL 
RECOGNIZED RULES OF INTERPRETATION AND 
CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. 
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POINT IX 
VIOLATIONS (IF SUCH VIOLATIONS OCCURR-
ED) BY FELT OF ITS CONTRACTS WITH CASSADY 
CANNOT BE IMPUTED TO PRUDENTIAL SO AS TO 
BAR PRUDENTIAL'S RECOVERY AGAINST HART-
FORD ON THE BOND. THE BOND SECURED DIS-
TINCT AND SEPARATE RIGHTS OF THE OBLIGEES. 
HARTFORD ASSUMED DISTINCT OBLIGATIONS TO 
PRUDENTIAL WHICH DID NOT RUN TO EITHER 
FELT OR PACIFIC AND PRUDENTIAL MAY THERE-
FORE HAVE ITS SEPARATE ACTION FOR THE 
BREACH OF THOSE OBLIGATIONS. HARTFORD CAN-
NOT DEFEND PRUDENTIAL'S ACTION ON THE 
GROUND THAT THE OTHER OBLIGEES, OR EITHER 
OF THEM, VIOLATED THE CONTRACTS WITH CAS-
SADY OR BREACHED CONDITIONS OF THE BOND. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
PRUDENTIAL ARE SUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE, 
COMPETENT AND MATERIAL EVIDENCE. 
POINT II 
THIS IS A LAW CASE AND THE FINDINGS OF 
THE TRIAL COURT ARE ENTITLED TO APPROVAL 
BY THE SUPREME COURT IF SUPPORTED BY COM-
PETENT EVIDENCE. 
The Morningside Heights Subdivision required 
financing through an individual mortgage on each 
of the one hundred lots. No project, construction 
loan was intended or ever contracted. As prospective 
Veteran purchasers were found for the one hundred 
lots, each applied separately for a loan from Pru-
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dential. Each loan necessarily had to go through 
the customary processing of loan applications, credit 
report, inspection, approval by the Veterans Ad-
ministration, approval by the loan committee, exe-
cution of the note and mortgage, search of the 
records, recording of the mortgage and issuance 
of a policy of title insurance. 
Knowing of this and being experienced in the 
complications of loans to Veterans, Prudential was 
unwilling to accept a "supervisory" type of bond 
as originally tendered by Cassady. (C. J. Cassady's 
deposition, Ex. H39, P. 6, R. 281). All parties were 
advised as to the project generally and Prudential 
required a performance bond generally such as was 
finally executed by Hartford. Then in reliance upon 
this bond, rather than the newly formed corpora-
tion, Cassady Company, it proceeded to loan moneys 
on the separate 100 mortgages as and when the 
same were executed and delivered. 
With nearly $1,000,000.00 committed to this 
Morningside Heights project, and being subject to 
disbursement of the loaned moneys as authorized by 
the several Veteran borrowers, Prudential could not 
indiscriminately pour in money to meet the needs 
of Cassady. The financial troubles of Cassady stem 
from many sources, not merely lags in the avail-
ability of funds from the mortgages. The evidence 
shows that Cassady was without adequate financing 
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of its own to carry forward independent of the loan 
proceeds. Cassady's construction practices appar-
ently were not efficient. There was inadequate su-
pervision of the work and materials of the sub-
contractors made by Cassady. Not one of the 100 
houses was ever taken to final completion by Cas-
sady so as to procure the required approval by the 
Veterans1 Administration, and the guaranty of 
Prudential's mortgages. 
Prudential was not responsible for those basic 
causes of the breakdown, nor were either of the 
other two obligees of the Bond, Felt and Pacific. 
They all relied upon Hartford's Bond to guarantee 
performance by Cassady. Cassady by the primary 
construction contract of July 19, 1950, covered by 
the Bond, agreed to cause construction to be started 
within ten days and"carried forward diligently and 
expeditiously until all of the one hundred houses 
have been completed . . . within 180 days from the 
date of execution of this agreement. . ." (Para. 26, 
Ex. PR-2). The paragraph extended the completion 
time should delays be caused by Felt. Then it re-
iterated that Cassady "covenants and agrees that 
the construction of said houses shall be completed 
within the time herein set forth. Time is declared 
to be of the essence." Paragraph 2 of this same 
basic construction contract bound Cassady to con-
struct the 100 houses "in strict conformity with the 
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specifications, plans and drawings" and "also in 
accordance with the rules and regulations of the 
Veterans Administration, the Federal Housing Ad-
ministration and the Prudential Federal Savings 
and Loan Association, as the case may be." 
Why was it vital to Prudential that such con-
struction be completed as scheduled and in accord-
ance with the rules of the Veterans Administration 
and that it have a guaranty of such performance 
by Hartford? Prudential had agreed to loan about 
$1,000,000.00 to the 100 prospective Veteran bor-
rowers, when they were found and proper mortgages 
had been executed, approved and recorded. These 
were only 4% interest bearing loans for 100% of 
the appraised value of the dwellings if completed 
in accordance with the Veterans Administration 
rules and had a duration of 25 years. Upon such 
completion, the loans were to be guaranteed by the 
Veterans Administration. Prudential had an agree-
ment whereby Prudential Insurance Company of 
America would purchase from it those one hundred 
mortgages. Hartford stipulates that not one of the 
one hundred houses was ever completed by Cassady 
in conformance with the rules of the Veterans Ad-
ministration. Thus Prudential was never able to sell 
the mortgages and has been compelled to hold these 
low grade mortgages in its portfolio. It has suffered 
the damages awarded by the trial Court. Hartford 
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by its brief does not contest the amount or method 
of computing the damages (p. 26 of Appellant's 
brief.) 
It is with this background that the Contract 
Bond must be understood and interpreted. The July 
19, 1950 construction contract (Ex. PR-2) was in-
corporated by reference into the bond. 
The last "Whereas" clause of the Bond recites 
that "the Lender Obligee, Title Obligee and Owner 
Obligee each desire protection as their interests may 
appear, in the event of the default by the Principal 
under said contract..." (Emphasis ours). 
The bond then undertakes in the next paragraph 
to indemnify and save harmless the obligees "from 
all loss, cost, damage, and expense which they may 
suffer . . ." Paragraph 2 of the Conditions in the 
Bond gives Hartford the option to cure any of Cas-
sady's defaults in performance of the construction 
contract (but Hartford never offered to cure any 
of the defaults). Then paragraph 6 reads: 
"The prior written approval of SURETY 
shall be required with regard to any changes 
or alterations in said contract where the cost 
thereof, added to prior changes or alterations, 
causes the aggregate cost of all changes and 
alterations to exceed 10 per cent of the orig-
inal contract price; but, except as to the fore-
going, any alterations which may be made 
in the terms of the contract, or in the 
work to be done under it, or the giv-
ing by the Obligees of any extension of 
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time for the performance of the contract, 
or any other forbearance on the part of either 
the Obligees or PRINCIPAL to the other, 
shall not in any way release SURETY or 
PRINCIPAL of the obligations of this in-
strument, notice of SURETY of any such al-
terations, extension, or forbearance being 
hereby waived." 
All of the changes and alterations pointed to 
by Appellant to excuse its liability under the Bond 
do not even approximate 10% of the original con-
tract price of $763,000.00. In addition, the extra 
costs, minor changes and alterations were all taken 
into account in February of 1951 when an exten-
sion of time was granted to Cassady and the price 
per house was increased, with the written consent 
of Appellant (Ex. PR-6). 
Point I of Appellants brief refers to four Find-
ings in this case which it claims are "wholly un-
supported by the evidence": 
(a) Finding 4, refering only to the Felt's 
qualification to do business, undoubtedly will be 
covered by Felt's brief but is immaterial and ir-
revelant as to Hartford's liability to Prudential; 
(b) Finding 27 refers to a purported failure 
of Prudential to collect lien waivers from Accoun-
tants and the Court found that such did not result 
in any damage to Hartford or Cassady. In the first 
place this collection of lien waivers was a duty im-
posed on Accountants and merely an optional right 
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vested in Prudential. See Ex. PR-7—contract of June 
16, 1950, Ex. PR-8—contract of August 10, 1950 
and Ex. PR-6, Supplemental Agreement of February 
16, 1951. In the second place, Prudential could only 
disburse funds as authorized by the borrowers and 
they together with Cassady, Felt and Hartford 
granted it discretionary powers of disbursement 
and none imposed upon Prudential a duty to collect 
lien waivers. This point will be more fully dis-
cussed in Point VII of this brief. 
(c) Finding 29 is criticized on the ground 
that the Court "apparently determined that Cas-
sady should not have commenced work until all 
of the mortgages had been executed and recorded." 
The finding does not say or infer that. It relates 
to the undisputed fact that the "delay" in disburs-
ing funds complained about by Appellant and Cas-
sady was not by reason of any fault on the part 
of Prudential as Cassady or Appellant knew that 
no funds could be disbursed until the mortgages had 
been executed and recorded. Cassady knew of its 
own financial means, its own credit sources and 
abilities and elected to commence and prosecute work 
prior to the recording of any of the mortgages. The 
evidence shows that Cassady knew that there was 
a separate loan agreement on each of the 100 se-
parate lots and Prudential would not advance money 
on a lot if the mortgage had not been recorded (C. 
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J. Cassady's testimony R. 250-1). Cassady took the 
initiative in going forward with its own money, sub-
contractors and credit. If Cassady had considered 
itself delayed by Felt not paying the money on a cer-
tain schedule, Cassady could have extended the con-
tract completion date until such had been corrected. 
Nevertheless Cassady plunged forward in building 
houses. It knew that it had no right to claim any 
money until each individual house was partially 
completed. The said construction contract further 
bound Cassady to arrange with its sub contractors 
to hold off their claims for payment in accordance 
with the percentage of completion schedule. In no 
event was more than 75 % of the agreed price per 
house to be paid until it had "passed all necessary 
inspections of the Veterans Administration, . . .". 
(Para.23ofEx.PR-2). 
(d) Finding 39 is a determination that the 
alleged breaches by Felt were not "substantial" and 
that if such had been, still the Supplemental Agree-
ment of February 16, 1951 resolved the same by the 
extensions of time and increase in the price per 
house to be paid by Felt to Cassady. We shall leave 
to Felt a detailed response to the individual asserted 
breaches. At this time we point out that even if Felt 
had breached its contractual duties to Cassady, 
Hartford would still be liable severally, as a com-
pensated surety, to Prudential. This point will be 
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discussed more in detail elsewhere in this brief. 
Likewise we shall analyze elsewhere in detail the 
effect of the accord and compromise arrangement 
accomplished by the Supplemental Agreement of 
February 16, 1951. We reiterate that the record 
shows that the purported breaches attributed by 
Appellant to Felt were not material. A compensated 
surety will not be discharged unless it shows actual 
prejudice to it by some departure by the obligee— 
there must be a material variance from the contract 
and only in such event there is a pro-tanto dis-
charge of the surety. 
50 Am. Jur., Suretyship, Sec. 320, Pg. 
1115. 
Appellant's "escape" paragraph is paragraph 
3 of the conditions of the Bond which reads: 
"The SURETY shall not be liable under 
this Bond to the Obligees, and either of them, 
unless the Obligees, or either of them, shall 
make payment to the PRINCIPAL in reason-
able compliance with the terms of said con-
tract as to payments, and each shall perform 
all other obligations to be performed by each 
Obligee under said contract at the time and 
in the manner therein set forth." 
The obligations, referred to therein are contain-
ed in "said contract" being the construction contract 
of July 19, 1950 (Ex. PR-2) between Felt and Cas-
sady. Prudential and Pacific demanded the Bond 
as a condition precedent to the loaning of any monies 
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or the insuring of the mortgage liens. Any asserted 
breach by Felt could not be held against Prudential 
as it had no duties under "said contract". 
Elsewhere in this brief we shall touch upon 
rules of construction of contracts executed by com-
pensated sureties and the strict construction in 
favor of the obligees. The co-relative rule is that 
ambiguities extant in the contract of the compen-
sated surety shall be resolved against the surety. 
The following "hornbook" rule is vital in con-
sidering the Findings of the trial court: 
"In a law case the trial judge sitting 
without a jury serves in two capacities. He 
finds the facts as a jury would and applies the 
law; we may not therefore go further into 
questions of fact in a law case tried to the 
court than we could in a law case tried to 
the jury. The judge passes exclusively upon 
the credibility of the witnesses and the weight 
of the evidence". (Colemere vs. Lay ton, 82 
Utah 142, 22 Pac. (2nd) 218.) 
Of equal importance is 
" . . . that on conflicting matters the evi-
dence is to be viewed in the light most favor-
able to the party for whom judgment was 
entered, and when so viewed, if there is evi-
dence supporting the judgment it will not 
be disturbed." (Staley vs. Grant, 2 Ut. (2d) 
421, 276 Pac. (2d) 489.) 
It is submitted that there is substantial evidence 
supporting each and every one of the Findings 
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questioned by Appellant, and that within the operat-
ing ambit of the foregoing rules said Findings 
should not be disturbed on appeal. 
POINT III 
THE PARTIES TO THE PRIMARY CONSTRUC-
TION CONTRACT AND THE CONTRACT BOND COM-
PROMISED AND SETTLED ANY AND ALL PRIOR 
CLAIMED CONTRACT BREACHES BY THE SUPPLE-
MENTAL AGREEMENT OF FEBRUARY 16, 1951. 
POINT IV 
HARTFORD IS ESTOPPED TO DENY THAT THE 
SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT OF FEBRUARY 16, 
1951 COMPROMISED AND SETTLED PRIOR ALLEG-
ED BREACHES BY FELT AND PRUDENTIAL. 
During the last five months of 1950 and Janu-
ary of 1951 difficulties arose on the project. Cas-
sady complained that it had been injured by the 
slowness of Felt in selling the lots and the con-
sequent delays in making money available to Cas-
sady from the Veterans' mortgages to Prudential. 
The cost of materials had been going up. Prudential 
was unable to disburse any money until appropriate 
mortgages had been executed and recorded. It had 
been delayed because of the necessity of first having 
the proposed Veteran borrower approved by the U. 
S. Veterans Administration before any action could 
be taken by its own loan committee. 
Cassady had also complained about the failure 
of Felt to supply a power connection to it at the 
inception of the project and that it had performed 
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some extra labor and furnished extra materials 
for which it had not been compensated by Felt. 
On the other hand, Cassady was wrangling 
with its sub-contractors as to their methods and 
supervision (Ex. H-33) and Cassady was not com-
pleting the houses on schedule, or at all. Both Felt 
and Prudential had become greatly alarmed. Pru-
dential's commitment from Prudential Insurance 
Company of America to purchase the mortgages 
as soon as they were guaranteed by the Veterans 
Administration, was expiring. All parties realized 
that something needed to be done to rejuvenate the 
project. 
It was with these urgent problems before them 
that the Supplemental Agreement (Ex. PR-6) dated 
February 16, 1951 was drawn and executed. The 
last "Whereas" clause reads: 
"WHEREAS, conditions have arisen 
whereby the parties deem it necessary and 
expedient to amend, modify, supplement and 
adjust certain provision of the Primary Con-
tract, Construction Contract, and certain of 
the provisions of the Disbursing Contract, 
as amended by the supplemental agreement 
of August 22,1950." 
This compromise arrangement accomplished 
five basic things: 
(a) extended the time of completion 
date from January 17th to June 1st, 1951; 
(b) set up new procedures for dis-
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bursement of the mortgage funds, including 
broad discretionary powers in Prudential; 
(c) increased the contract price pay-
able to Cassady on each of the houses above 
the original agreed schedule; 
(d) changed the disbursement limit 
prior to final completion from 75% of the 
total price to 90% of the total price per house; 
and 
(e) acknowledged and ratified the com-
plete accounting by Prudential of all mort-
gage fund disbursements to that date. 
All parties signed the document. However, 
Hartford placed a limited approval when its turn 
to sign came. As its bond was given only as to the 
construction contract of July 19, 1950 (Ex PR-2) 
between Felt and Cassady it endorsed its consent 
to only the changes in that construction contract. 
By this, it approved of the extension of time, the 
increase in the prices to be paid to its contractor, 
the changes in percentages and the new disburse-
ment procedures so as to grant to Prudential dis-
cretionary powers. These three benefits and changes 
were approved by Hartford and its bonded con-
tractor, Cassady. 
It does not seem appropriate or proper for 
Hartford now to assert those matters which were 
compromised by this Supplemental Agreement (Ex. 
PR-6) as an excuse upon which to seek an escape 
of liability. Hartford has had all the benefits of 
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the extension of time, an increase in the price per 
house and a flexibility in financing, yet it now wants 
to revert to all the alleged prior breaches by Felt 
such as: failing to furnish electric power in July of 
1950 and delays in paying the requested progress 
payments on schedule as a defense against its li-
ability to Prudential. 
At the time of this Supplemental Agreement of 
February 16, 1951, Hartford's bonded contractor 
had already passed the deadline for completing all 
of the 100 houses and had not yet completed one 
of them. Prudential could have stepped in on its 
contract and closed off the project then, but instead 
granted five additional months for completion. Felt 
could have stopped the contractor at that point also, 
but it agreed to the nearly five month extension 
and in addition boosted the price per house to be 
paid to Hartford's bonded contractor. 
Here was an opportunity for the contractor 
to finish up the houses and gain more money. Hart-
ford apparently welcomed this extension and signed 
its approval. Obviously Hartford considered this a 
fair and proper compromise of the prior difficulties 
or it would not have joined in the approval of the 
same in February of 1951. 
In reliance upon such compromise and the ap-
proval by Hartford, Prudential withheld and waived 
its accrued right to step in and take over the pro-
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ject and agreed to make available increased amounts 
of money otherwise not payable then. Hartford is 
now estopped to assert prior, claimed breaches of 
the contracts by Felt or Prudential. Hartford has 
received the benefit of the extension in time and 
the increase in price and funds to its bonded con-
tractor and the Court will not hear its efforts to 
deny such acquiescence. 
Cassady, with Hartford's approval, then pro-
ceeded in its efforts to complete the 100 houses in 
accordance with its contract so as to procure ap-
proval by the Veterans Administration. The in-
spection reports reflect numerous deficiencies in 
workmanship and materials on all of the dwellings. 
Though the construction contract limited the maxi-
mum obligation to pay Cassady to 75% of the 
agreed price per house prior to final completion and 
approval by the Veterans Administration, this ceil-
ing was raised by the Supplemental Agreement of 
February 16, 1951 to 90 %, by giving Prudential op-
tional power to retain only 10% of the down pay-
ment and loan proceeds until a guarantee by the 
Veterans Administration had been issued on the 
mortgages after the houses passed final inspection. 
The increase in price, the extension of time, 
the increase in the percentage of payment up to 
90 %, all aided Cassady to proceed. Still it lacked 
the ability or willingness to complete the houses 
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either by itself or through subcontractors. Cassidy's 
letter to Mr. Gerald Jackson, the general carpentry 
sub-contractor on the project, written during this 
period on June 13, 1951 reflects the inefficient 
piece-work procedures being followed, the absence 
of adequate supervision and a statement that "at no 
time has there ever been a material shortage which 
would ever necessitate the laying off of men or pre-
vent the hiring of additional men if the work were 
progressing systematically." (This is Hartford's 
own Ex. H-33). 
The project again closed down. Cassady was 
never able to procure final approval by the Veterans 
Administration of a single house. Veterans Ad-
ministration finally on October 8, 1952 refused to 
guarantee the mortgages. Neither Felt nor Pru-
dential could be blamed now for the shut down 
after their generous effort in February of 1951 
to give Cassady every opportunity to complete the 
project. 
Appellant stands in the position of its princi-
pal. Nothing appears in the record to show any evi-
dence or an alleged breach of contract by Pruden-
tial, or Felt after this February 16th, 1951 Sup-
plemental Agreement. Notwithstanding their efforts 
to help out Cassady, it did not finish the project 
or any house therein. The complete abandonment 
of the entire project by Cassady soon followed. 
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Appellant could have stepped forward under its 
Bond and completed the project but it did noth-
ing further. 
The trial Court found as a fact that Cassady 
had admitted, declared and agreed that Prudential 
had performed all of its contractual obligations to 
February 16, 1951 (Finding 17, PR-29-31). Fur-
ther, the trial Court found as a fact that any dif-
ferences between Felt, Cassady and Hartford were 
resolved by extensions of time granted to Cassady 
by the Supplemental Agreement between the parties 
entered February 16, 1951, (Finding 39, PR-39). 
This being a law case and there being substantial 
evidence to support such Findings, the appellate 
Court is bound thereby. 
POINT V 
EXPRESSIONS OF OPINION AS TO THE CON-
STRUCTION OR INTERPRETATION OF A CONTRACT 
BY ONE OF THE PARTIES THERETO AFTER A 
CONTROVERSY HAS ARISEN AS TO THE LIABILITY 
TO IT OF THE OTHER PARTY TO THE CONTRACT 
AND NOT ACTED UPON BY THE OTHER PARTY 
HAVE NO WEIGHT OR RELEVANCY IN INTERPRE-
TING THE CONTRACT. 
Appellant in its Point V-D attempts to apply 
the rule that "contemporary construction of a con-
tract by the acts of the parties is entitled to great 
weight" in interpreting the meaning of a contract 
(6 Ruling Case Law 852). Reference is made to the 
29 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
letter of Sept. 5, 1952, addressed by Mr. Wilson 
Taylor, attorney for the Appellant, to the attorney 
for Prudential (Ex. H-29) and Prudential's reply 
thereto of September 10, 1952 (Ex. H-28) and also 
to the testimony of Mr. Wilson Taylor (R. 200-205, 
218, I. 219) as to a conversation in San Fran-
cisco during late September, 1952, between Mr. 
Wilson Taylor and the attorney for Prudential as 
to Appellant's liability under its bond. In that con-
versation Mr. Taylor denied liability on the part of 
his client, basing his position on the grounds set 
forth in his letter of September 5, 1952 (Ex. H-29) 
to wit, that breaches by Felt of its contract with 
Cassady were imputable to Prudential. Mr. Taylor 
asserted that in such conversation the attorney for 
Prudential said, "Well, you are probably right about 
that." (R. 219). 
The foregoing is the totality of evidence con-
cerning the alleged "contemporaneous practical con-
struction" of the meaning of the bond by the parties. 
In order to understand fully the situation existing 
at that time, it is necessary to refer to Prudential's 
Ex. PR-30. This exhibit is the written demand dated 
August 12, 1952, by Prudential Felt and Pacific 
upon Cassady and Hartford to complete the dwell-
ing houses in the Morningside project and also a 
demand that they secure release of labor and ma-
terial liens filed against the project. Mr. Wilson 
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Taylor in his letter of Sept. 5, 1952 (Ex. H-29) 
admits receipt of this demand by Hartford. The evi-
dence shows that by September, 1952, the project 
was uncompleted and that Hartford had denied 
liability on its part to take over and complete it. 
(Ex. H-29). A controversy had therefore arisen be-
tween the parties as to Hartford's responsibility 
prior to the San Francisco conversation between 
Wilson Taylor and Prudential's attorney. There was 
no practical construction of the meaning of the 
relevant provisions of the bond during the progress 
of the construction work. The conversation between 
two attorneys occurred subsequent to the cessation 
of operations and subsequent to the controversy 
which had arisen as to Hartford's liability. A few 
days later (on Oct. 8, 1952) Veterans Administra-
tion refused to guarantee payment of the veterans' 
mortgages, (R. 10, 11, 14, 52, 53). In February, 
1952, the status of the project and the ability of 
Cassady to complete it and fully perform his contract 
was in serious question and a conference of the in-
terested parties was held in Salt Lake City with Mr. 
Wilson E. Taylor representing Hartford present 
(R. 187). At that time Hartford knew that Cas-
sady was without funds and unable to complete 
the project (R. 215). Cassady had not finally aban-
doned the work "but he was probably willing to." 
(R. 215). Mr. Wilson Taylor, as representative of 
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Hartford, knew at that time that Veterans Admin-
istration had required "a long list of miscellaneous, 
small-miscellaneous items that had to be done [to 
the houses] to make them acceptable to Veterans 
Administration and Federal Housing Administra-
tion." (R. 217). 
The mere opinion of a party as to the con-
struction of a contract, not carried into effect by 
any act, will not amount to a practical construction 
of the contract. 
13 Corpus Juris — Contracts — Sec. 517, 
pg. 549 
Shaw vs. Andrews, 62 Fed. 460 
Potter vs. Phoenix Insurance Co., 63 Fed. 
482 
James Poultry Co. vs. Nebraska City, 
135 Neb. 787, 284 N.W. 273 
"The opinion of the manager of the seller 
as to its legal obligations under the contract, 
as reflected by his statements in correspon-
dence after the execution of the instrument is 
not entitled to any weight in determining 
whether a valid contract was made." 
Miller v. Robertson, 266, U.S. 243, 69 
L. Ed. 243 
Previous to the time of the San Francisco con-
versation, a demand had been made upon Hartford 
to complete the project and relieve the properties 
from labor and material liens. Hartford had denied 
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its duty under the bond to comply with the demand. 
After the conversation, Hartford continuously as-
serted this same legal position. It did not change or 
modify it, and was not induced to change its posi-
tion because of the conversation. The controversy 
continued. Hence there was no harmonious construc-
tion ever adopted by the parties. (Ellis vs. Stone, 
21 N.M. 230, 158 Pac. 480; L.R.A. 1916 F. Pg. 
1228; Hodges Irrigation Co. v. Swan Creek Canal 
Co., I l l Utah 405,181 Pac. (2nd) 217.) 
The statement of the attorney for Prudential 
in tentative and qualified assent to Wilson Taylor's 
theory of Hartford's defense was no more than an 
expression of opinion regarding the law governing 
the case and was not an admission of fact. It cannot 
be applied in construing the contract. The admis-
sion of a party in relation to a question of law is 
no evidence. 
Crockett v. Morrison, 11 Missouri 3 
Wright v. Quathrochi, 330 Mo. 173; 49 
S.W. (2nd) 3 
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Richards 
(Texas C. A.) 290 S.W. 912 
Caswell v. Maplewood Garage, 84 N. H. 
241,149 Atl. 746, 73 A.L.R. 433 
Grand Truck Western R. Co. v. H. W. Nelson 
Co., 116 Fed. (2d) CCA 6th 823, Rehearing 
denied 118 Fed. (2nd) 252 
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Atlanta and Lowry Nat. Bank v. Maughan, 
et al, 25 Ga. App 25,131 S.E. 916 
31 Corpus Jur. Sec, Sec. 272, Pg. 1026 
It therefore appears that Appellants Point V-D 
has no value in interpreting the bond now in ques-
tion. 
POINT VI 
THE RULE GOVERNING THE INTERPRETATION 
OF CONTRACTS THAT WHERE A CONTRACT BEARS 
MORE THAN ONE REASONABLE MEANING AN IN-
TERPRETATION IS PREFERRED WHICH OPERATES 
MORE STRONGLY AGAINST THE PARTY FROM 
WHOM IT PROCEEDS HAS NO APPLICATION IN 
THIS CASE. HARTFORD'S REPRESENTATIVE CRI-
TICALLY EXAMINED A PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF 
THE BOND MADE BY PRUDENTIAL, ALTERED IT 
SEVERAL RESPECTS; CAUSED THE BOND TO BE 
TYPEWRITTEN IN HIS OWN OFFICE AND FINALLY 
EXECUTED IT ON BEHALF OF HARTFORD. THE 
BOND IS IN LEGAL EFFECT AN INSURANCE CON-
TRACT AND HARTFORD IS A COMPENSATED SUR-
ETY AGAINST WHOM THE BOND WILL BE CON-
STRUED FAVORABLE TO THE OBLIGEES. 
1. A strict construction of the bond against 
Prudential is not justified as it did not draft the 
bond in final form. Hartford was as much the author 
of the bond as Prudential. 
Appellants Point V-C represents an effort to 
apply the well known rule of contract interpreta-
tion set forth in Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 
236(d) which is quoted by Appellant. There can 
be no quarrel with this statement, but it has no 
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application to the facts and circumstances surround-
ing the execution and delivery of the bond which 
is the subject of this action. Hartford's Ex. H 38 
is a yellow paper rough draft of a bond which was 
prepared by the attorney for Prudential (R. 42). 
The evidence shows clearly that at the time this 
draft was made the question as to the form and 
effect of the proposed bond had not been settled 
and was in the process of negotiation. (R. 232, 327, 
328, 329). A supervisory bond had been drafted by 
Hartford (Blackburn's deposition, Ex. H-40, pg. 5, 
and also R. 414). Thereafter C. P. Cassady came 
to Salt Lake City from Arcadia, California, and 
presented this draft of bond to the interested par-
ties ,C. J. Cassady's deposition, Ex. H.-39, pg. 6). 
It was rejected by Prudential (C. J. Cassady's depo-
sition, Ex. H-39, pg. 6; R. 281). As a result of the 
disagreement as to the form of the bond, Pruden-
tial's attorney made a suggested draft (Ex. H-38) 
and it was delivered to C. J. Cassady, who in turn 
delivered it to C. P. Cassady. He returned to Arca-
dia, California, with this draft and delivered it to one 
Van Horn, an insurance agent who wrote business 
for Hartford. Van Horn in turn delivered it to 
A. L. Blackburn (C. P. Cassady's deposition, Ex. 
H-39, pg. 9, 10, 12; Deco Van Horn deposition, Ex. 
H-41, pgs. 5, 6, 7; A. L. Blackburn deposition, Ex. 
H-40, pg. 6). Mr. Blackburn then proceeded to make 
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alterations in the draft (Ex. H-38) by eliminating 
one paragraph in its entirety, changing the number-
ing of certain paragraphs, inserting the words 
"have the option to" in newly renumbered paragraph 
2 and adding an addendum. The bond document 
which was finally executed by Hartford (Ex. PR-1) 
was then typewritten in Hartford's office under Mr. 
Blackburn's direction. (Deposition of A. L. Black-
burn, Ex. H-40, pgs. 8, 9, 10). Mr. Blackburn at 
that time was superintendent of Hartford's bond 
department. In that capacity he had "general charge 
of underwriting acceptance of bonds", (Deposition 
of A. L. Blackburn, Ex. H-40, pg. 2) . It was Mr. 
Blackburn's duty to supervise and approve any of 
Van Horn's bond writing or underwriting beyond 
Van Horn's general limits or for any type other 
than Van Horn had general authority to write 
(Deposition of A. L. Blackburn, Ex. H-38, pgs. 3 
and 4). Blackburn had dictated and prepared the 
supervisory bond which Prudential had rejected 
(Deposition of A. L. Blackburn, Ex. H-38, pg. 5). 
It is manifest from this evidence that Hart-
ford's representative and agent, Blackburn, had as 
much to do with preparing and determining the 
final form of the bond (Ex. P-l) which is the sub-
ject of this action, as did Prudential's attorney. 
The draft prepared by Prudential's attorney (Ex. 
H-38) was thoroughly "worked over" by Blackburn. 
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He had complete authority to negotiate this bond, 
and in the exercise of this authority he proceeded 
critically to examine the yellow paper draft and 
amend it to suit his ideas. The draft was no longer 
that of Prudential as it had passed through Hart-
ford's processes of examination and amendment. 
There can be denying the fact that the bond in final 
form was typewritten under Blackburn's direction 
in his office, and then finally executed by him on 
behalf of Hartford. Here is no situation where 
the cited rule of interpretation of contracts will be 
applied. Prudential did not prepare a bond and place 
it before Hartford for execution on a "take it or 
leave it" basis — a situation which characterizes 
the cases where this rule has been applied. Neither 
did Prudential present a printed or fixed form of 
bond usually used in the conduct of its business and 
require Hartford to execute it. It did prepare a 
yellow paper draft of a bond which manifestly was 
to be presented to the surety company for examina-
tion, criticism, amendment and final acceptance by 
the interested parties — not Hartford alone, but 
all of the parties to the bond. There is no evidence 
that either Prudential, Felt or Pacific exercised 
any unfair influence or pressure on Hartford to 
cause it to write the bond for which it received the 
sum of $7,630.00 premium. The rule has been well 
stated: 
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"In the absence of the taking of an un-
fair advantage, the fact that a contract is 
drawn by the attorney for one of the parties 
does not necessarily call for the application 
of a strict construction against him." (Syl. in 
Moore v. Freeman, 58 N.M. 139, 266 Pac. 
(2nd) 674, 41 A.L.R. (2nd) 1388). 
2. Hartford is a compensated surety and 
doubtful provisions of the bond should be construed 
in favor of the obligees. 
As above stated, Hartford received the sum of 
$7,630.00 premium for writing the bond in ques-
tion, (Ex. P- l ) . It was therefore a compensated 
surety. The rule is firmly established in Utah that 
in the case of a compensated surety, doubtful pro-
visions of a contract, the performance of which the 
surety guarantees, are construed in favor of the 
obligee. If a bond is open to two constructions, one 
of which will uphold and the other defeat the claim 
of the obligee, that which is most favorable to the 
claim of the obligee will be adopted. 
50 Am. Jur.—Suretyship—Sec. 318, pg. 
1112 
21 Ruling Case Law—Principal and Sur-
ety—Sec. 200 
Annotation: 12 A.L.R. 382 
Annotation: 94 A.L.R. 876 
M. H. Walker Realty Co. v. American 
Surety Co., 60 Utah 435, 211 Pac. 998 
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Atlantic Trust Co. v. Laureriburg, 160 
Fed. 90; 90 CCA. 274 
Murray City vs. Banks, 62 Utah 296, 
219 Pac. 246 
Tolton Investment Co. v. Maryland Cas-
ualty Co., 77 Utah 226, 293 Pac. 611. 
Hartford was paid a substantial premium in 
consideration of its assuming the risk of surety on 
a bond which its authorized agent had placed in 
final form, after critical examination, analysis and 
amendment. 
3. Bonds of compensated sureties are treated 
as insurance contracts and are construed most 
strongly against the insurer in case of ambiguities 
or uncertainties. 
50 Am. Jur. Suretyship, Sec. 318, pgs. 
1112, 1113 
Annotation: 63 A.L.R. 721 
Annotation: 100 A.L.R. 1452 
National Surety Co. v. McCormick, 268 
Fed. (CCA.) 185 
Tibbett vs. Mercantile Credit Guaranty 
Co., 79 Fed. (CCA) 95 
M. K. and T. Rwy. Co. v. American Sur-
ety Co., 291 Mo. 92,236 S.W. 657 
M. H. Walker Realty Co. v. American 
Surety Co., supra 
Coney v. United Surety Co., 217 N.Y. 
268, 111 N.E. 832. 
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The facts surrounding the final draft of the 
bond (Sub. par. 1, supra) and these acknowledged 
rules of interpretation (Sub. para. 2 and 3, supra) 
nullify and obliterate any argument of Appellant 
that the bond in question should be construed 
against Prudential because of its history during the 
process of negotiations of the parties as to its form. 
POINT VII 
PRUDENTIAL DID NOT VIOLATE ANY OF ITS 
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS OWING BY IT EITHER 
TO HARTFORD, CASSADY OR FELT SUCH AS WOULD 
BAR ITS RECOVERY OF DAMAGES. 
Appellant in its Point III asserts that Pru-
dential was guilty of three distinct breaches of its 
contractual obligations owing by it to Hartford, 
Cassady and Felt and is therefore prevented from 
recovering from Hartford the admitted damages 
suffered by it. Each alleged breach will be discussed 
separately. 
1. Failure to obtain Lien Waver. There was 
no obligation upon Prudential to collect lien waivers 
from laborers and materialmen. That obligation 
rested solely upon Associated Accountants, the in-
dependent disbursing agency. Proof of this asser-
tion is found in the following relevant provisions 
of the several contracts involved in this action. 
(a) Contract of June 16, 1950, between Pru-
dential and Syndicate. (Ex. PR-7). 
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"It is agreed that disbursements of the 
proceeds of the mortgage loans contemplated 
by this agreement and the down payments 
deposited with Prudential under this agree-
ment, if any, will be made by Prudential to 
Associated Accountants at the time and times 
and in the manner herein provided, without 
responsibility on the part of Prudential, for 
the proper allocation and disbursements of 
said funds by Associated Accountants; and 
that payment by Prudential to Associated Ac-
countants, as herein provided, shall be a full 
acquittance of Prudential for said payments. 
It is further understood between Prudential 
and Syndicate that Associated Accountants 
will disburse the funds received by them from 
Prudential in payment of all costs of the erec-
tion and construction of said dwelling houses 
and improvements to the end that the con-
tractor and all sub-contractors shall receive 
just and proper amounts due them. Associ-
ated Accountants shall secure from all la-
borers on said dwelling houses, from all 
suppliers of material used in the construc-
tion of said dwelling houses, and from 
all sub-contractors, written waivers of lien 
and lien rights at the time of making 
a payment or payments to them, and said 
waivers shall cover or total the amount of the 
particular disbursement of the loan proceeds 
and down payment (if any) made by Pru-
dential to Associated Accountants and from 
which disbursement said payment or pay-
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merits is or are made. Such lien waivers shall 
be delivered to Prudential prior to any fur-
ther disbursement by Prudential and Pruden-
tial will be under no obligation to make a 
further disbursement until it shall have re-
ceived lien waivers covering all prior disburse-
merits." (Par. 2, Ex. PR-7). 
(b) Contract of August 10, 1950, between 
Felt, Cassady, Associated Accountants and, Pruden-
tial (Ex.PR-8). 
"Before any disbursement of any funds 
is made by Third Party [Associated Accoun-
tants] as provided in the next preceeding par-
agraph, in payment of any labor and materi-
als furnished on the job, the Third Party [As-
sociated Accountants] shall obtain lien waiv-
ers from the various sub-contractors involved 
for such labor and materials furnished up to 
the period involved in such disbursement. 
Such lien waivers will thereupon be delivered 
by Third Party [Associated Accountants] to 
Fourth Party [Prudential] as required by the 
contract entered into between First Party 
[Felt] and Fourth Party [Prudential] date-
ed June 16, 1950, in order that further dis-
bursements of loan proceeds may be had from 
Fourth Party [Prudential]. (Par. 4, Ex. 
PR-8). 
(c) Contract of February 16, 1951, between 
Prudential, Felt, Cassady and Associated Accoun-
tants (Ex. PR-6). 
"The balance of the loan proceeds, plus 
any deposited funds and the down payment, 
if any, shall be disbursed by Prudential from 
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and after the date of this Supplemental Agree-
ment at such time or times, in such manner 
and in such amounts as in the sole judgment 
and discretion of Prudential is necessary and 
proper to secure the expeditious completion of 
the aforesaid dwelling houses and to assure 
the payment of all sub-contractors, material-
men and laborers engaged in work on said 
project. The decision of Prudential as to the 
time, manner, method and amount of pay-
ments shall be conclusive and shall be bind-
ing upon the parties hereto. Notwithstanding, 
the immediate foregoing provision, Pruden-
tial is hereby authorized and empowered to 
withhold ten per cent (10%) of all loan pro-
ceeds and down payments and not pay the 
same until the dwelling houses shall have 
passed final inspection by Federal Housing 
Administration; Veterans Administration or 
Prudential and all qualifications have been 
met to secure mortgage insurance by Federal 
Housing Administration or guarantee by Vet-
eran Administration. (Par. 2 of Art. I of 
Ex. PR-6). 
"It is understood and agreed that the 
sums indicated in the next preceding para-
graph shall be paid by the first party [Felt] 
to the sub-contractor involved through a bond-
ed disbursing agency. All payments due from 
first party [Felt] to the second party for 
or on account of the construction of the 
houses mentioned and described in paragraph 
22 hereof shall be made from and after the 
date of this agreement at such time or times, 
or in such manner and in such amounts as 
Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Asso-
ciation deems necessary and proper to secure 
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the expeditious completion of the aforesaid 
dwelling houses and to assure the payment of 
all sub-contractors, materialmen and laborers 
engaged in work on said project within the 
limits as set forth in paragraph 22, as amend-
ed hereby. In no event, however, shall the 
payments be less than those prescribed in this 
paragraph 23 prior to this amendment. No 
payments shall be made unless second party 
[Cassady] shall approve and certify in writ-
ing that such payments are only for work 
incorporated in and materials delivered to 
the project. (Par. 2 of Art. I l l of Ex. PR-6). 
It is manifest from the foregoing excerpts from 
the contracts involved in this action that up to the 
date of the execution of the Supplemental Contract 
of Feb. 16, 1951 (Ex. PR-6) that all payments to 
laborers and materialmen were made by Associated 
Accountants, which concern was an independent, 
bonded disbursing agency. The contract of August 
10,1950, between Felt, Cassady, Associated Accoun-
tants and Prudential (Ex. PR-8) affirmatively 
placed the duty on the disbursing agency of collect-
ing lien waivers and delivering them to Prudential. 
There was no responsibility for this task placed 
on Prudential. Prudential could refuse if it elected 
to make additional disbursements from mortgage 
proceeds to Associated Accountants if it did not 
receive lien waivers from the latter, but it was not 
prohibited from doing so. Neither did the contracts 
condition such disbursements on Prudential receiv-
ing such lien waivers. 
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After the execution of the Supplemental Con-
tract of February 16, 1951 (Ex. PR-6), Prudential 
was vested with plenary discretionary power and 
authority in making disbursements. At its option 
it could withhold 10% of any amount to be paid un-
til the houses passed final inspection by Veterans 
Administration, but here again such action was 
optional and not mandatory. (It should be noted 
that Hartford approved this provision vesting this 
authority in Prudential by its endorsement attached 
to the Supplemental Contract of Feb. 16, 1951 (Ex. 
PR-6)). There was no requirement covering col-
lection of lien waivers after February 16, 1951. 
It is impossible to torture from these contract 
provisions any duty imposed upon Prudential to 
secure lien waivers as a condition to making future 
disbursements from mortgage proceeds. Since no 
such duty ever existed, there could be no breach of 
contract on this score. 
2. Neglect by Prudential to Withhold Pay-
ments or Require that Cassady's Defective work 
be Corrected. 
Appellant's counsel must make this contention 
with his "tongue in his cheek" to use old folk speech. 
Note what he wrote in his brief: 
"We anticipate that Prudential Federal's 
attorneys will contend that the contractual 
provisions above referred to, were optional 
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or elective and not mandatory. That may well 
be true, in the sense that Prudential Federal 
would not be liable in damages to other parties 
for failure to take action authorized by the 
contract. It did, however, apart from any 
contractual obligation have a common law 
duty to mitigate its own damages." (Pg. 41) 
Counsel is entirely correct in admitting that 
Prudential's authority with respect to withholding 
payments or requiring Cassady to perform its con-
tract was optional and not mandatory. It possessed 
the authority under the several contracts (pertin-
ent paragraphs being quoted above) to stop making 
disbursements of the mortgage proceeds unless and 
until Cassady effectually remedied the defects in 
the houses reported by Veterans Administration in-
spection, but it was not compelled to do so. Likewise 
under paragraph 7 of the contract between it, Felt, 
Cassady and Associated Accountants dated June 16, 
1950 (Ex. PR-7), Prudential could "at its election, 
enter upon all the real estate herein involved and 
complete or alter said dwelling houses, or any of 
them, to comply with the plans and specifications", 
but this grant was a right or privilege and not the 
imposition of a compulsory duty. 
There is no ambiguity or uncertainty in the 
contracts as to Prudential's option to stop disburse-
ments or to elect to complete the project upon Cas-
sady's default, and likewise there is not a suggestion 
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that Prudential was obligated to follow such courses 
of action. 
As to Prudential's duty to mitigate or lessen 
the damages suffered by it by reason of Cassady's 
failure to complete the houses so as to earn the ap-
proval of Veterans Administration and its guaran-
tee of the mortgages, the following quotation from 
Appellant's brief is determinative: 
"The amount of damages awarded to 
plaintiff, Prudential Federal and Felt is not 
in issue in this appeal and we therefore do not 
detail the basis on which damages to those two 
plaintiffs were determined." (Page 26 of Ap-
pellant's brief). 
The duty of a party to take such action as will 
mitigate or lessen his damages goes to the question 
of the measure or amount of damages. Such duty 
does not relate to the determination of the question 
as to whether a cause of action exists or whether 
his action or lack of action bars recovery. 
"In legal contemplation the term 'dam-
ages' is the sum of money which the law 
awards or imposes as pecuniary compensa-
tion, recompense, or satisfaction for an in-
jury done or a wrong sustained as a conse-
quence either of a breach of a contractual ob-
ligation or a tortious act. Expressed in other 
terms, damages are the pecuniary conse-
quences which the law imposes for the breach 
of some duty or the violation of some right." 
(Emphasis supplied) (15 Am. Jur.—Dam-
ages, Sec. 2, page 387). 
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The so called duty to avoid consequences cannot 
arise until a cause of action has accrued which will 
entitle the plaintiff to at least nominal damages. 
1 Sedgwick on Damages (8th Ed.) Sec. 
204 
Dippold et al, vs. Cathlamet Timber Co. 
( I l l Oregon 199,225 Pac. 202) 
15 Am. Jur.—Damages—Sec. 27, pg. 423 
Annotations: 81 ALR 283 
Inasmuch as Appellant elected not to question 
on this appeal either the amount of damages award-
ed Prudential or the basis on which they were deter-
mined, it logically follows that its assertion that 
Prudential was guilty of breach of contract, barring 
recovery because it failed to mitigate damages has 
no legal substance. Appellant, by its acceptance of 
the amount of damages awarded Prudential has 
foreclosed the question as to mitigation, and in any 
event the duty to mitigate damages arises only after 
a plaintiff's right to recovery has been determined. 
(3) Failure to take over and complete project. 
This point overlaps the alleged breach discussed 
in B, supra, and is really the same proposition ar-
gued by appellant under its sub-caption B of its 
Point III. It has been answered above. Prudential, 
under the terms of the several contracts, was not 
charged with the duty to complete the project. It 
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had the privilege of doing so at its option. The pri-
vilege imposed no duty. Prudential did not breach 
any contract in this regard. Appellant had the same 
right and option to "cure and remedy said default 
and complete performance of said contract." (Ex. 
PR-1) 
POINT VIII 
IN ARRIVING AT A CORRECT CONSTRUCTION 
AND INTERPRETATION OF THE BOND, THE COURT 
SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT THE ACTIVITIES OF 
PACIFIC AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THIS CASE 
ARE WHOLLY IMMATERIAL AND IRRELEVANT, 
AND THAT PRUDENTIAL IS A THIRD PARTY BENE-
FICIARY UNDER THE CONTRACT BETWEEN FELT 
AND CASSADY DATED JULY 19, 1950 (EX. PR-2). 
THE COURT SHOULD THEN APPLY CERTAIN WELL 
RECOGNIZED RULES OF INTERPRETATION AND 
CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS. 
Before reaching the heart of the controversy 
between Prudential and Hartford, Respondent be-
lieves that it should invite the Court's attention to 
certain subsidiary, but highly relevant propositions, 
which affect the solution of the principal legal prob-
lem in this case. Each proposition will be discussed 
separately. 
1. Pacific was not a party to any contract 
involved in this action and was not guilty of any 
violation of the terms of the bond. 
Pacific's role in this transaction was that of 
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an insurer of the titles of the 100 building sites in 
Morningside Heights upon which the veteran-own-
ers placed separate mortgages to secure the repay-
ment of funds loaned to them individually by Pru-
dential. (Subtantially all of the mortgage proceeds, 
under written authority of the veteran mortgagors, 
were disbursed by Prudential to Associated Accoun-
tants under the terms of the contract dated August 
10, 1950, between Prudential, Felt, Cassady and 
Associated Accountants (Ex. PR-8). The insurance 
contracts written by Pacific were A-T-A policies in 
favor of Prudential and guaranteed that the liens 
of the mortgages wherein Prudential was mortgagee 
were first and prior, except for current taxes. Work 
had been commenced on the project and material 
delivered to the site prior to the recording of Pru-
dential's mortgages (a fact known by Pacific). Pa-
cific issued these policies upon the reliance of the 
protection afforded it by the bond. (R. 169, 170, 
171, 172). Since Pacific was not a party to any of 
the contracts, Hartford, of course, has never as-
serted it violated any of them. Further, Hartford 
has never asserted that Pacific violated any of the 
conditions of the bond. It has resisted liability to 
Pacific solely on the ground that Pacific suffered 
no compensable damages (See Appellant's brief, 
pages 59-63). Pacific's activities in this transaction 
are irrelevant to the issues in this case and may be 
wholly disregarded. 
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2. Prudential is a third party beneficiary un-
der the Contract dated July 19, 1950, between Felt 
and Cassady (Ex. PR-2). 
The above mentioned contract contains perti-
nent provisions as follows: 
Par. 1. "The Second Party [Cassady] 
agrees to supervise, coordinate and procure 
the construction of a total of 100 houses upon 
contiguous lots in said Subdivision to be desig-
nated by First Party [Felt Syndicate], said 
houses to be built in strict accordance with 
the plans, specifications and elevations on file 
with the Veterans' Administration, a copy of 
which plans, elevations and specifications are 
attached to this agreement * * *." 
Par. 2. "Second Party [Cassady] a-
grees fully to perform this agreement in strict 
conformity with the specifications, plans and 
drawings referred to, or incorporated herein, 
and also in conformity with any plans, draw-
ings and specifications in effect at the date of 
this agreement required by any governmental 
agency having the right to demand that said 
work should be performed in the manner spe-
cified by such agency, and also in accordance 
with the rules and regulations of the Veterans 
Administration, the Federal Housing Admin-
istration and the Prudential Federal Savings 
and Loan Association, as the case may be." 
Par. 11. "Second Party [Cassady] a-
grees to furnish a performance bond in the 
amount of $763,000.00 * * * for the faithful 
performance of this contract, and the ade-
quate, skillful and prompt supervision and co-
51 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ordination of the construction program, and 
for the completion of such construction within 
the time hereinafter specified. * * * Said bond 
is to be furnished before any work is com-
menced by Second Party [Cassady] and shall 
run to the First Party [Felt], to Prudential 
Federal Savings and Loan Association, to the 
Security Title Company or the title insurance 
company issuing the title insurance policies 
on each of said lots * * *." 
Par. 18. requires fire insurance during 
course of construction with loss payable to 
Prudential. 
Par. 25. provides that Cassady should be 
entitled, in addition to all other compensa-
tion, to 50% of all other profits if it "shall 
perform its undertakings in this agreement 
to the satisfaction of the Veterans Admin-
istration, Federal Housing Administration, 
and Prudential Federal Savings and Loan As-
sociation, as the case may be." 
It is manifest that in this basic agreement 
Prudential became and was a third party benefici-
ary inasmuch as (a) the dwelling houses must be 
constructed not only with the approval of the V.A. 
and F.H.A., but also of Prudential, and (b) Pru-
dential is nominated in specific terms as a bene-
ficiary of the bond which Cassady must provide 
under the terms of the contract. Stated otherwise, 
the violation by Cassady of the covenant to cause 
these dwelling houses to be constructed with the 
Veterans Administration's approval gives rise to 
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a cause of action not only in favor of Felt, but 
also in favor of Prudential. Under the decisions 
of the Utah Supreme Court, Prudential is a third 
party beneficiary to this contract and is entitled 
to prosecute an action upon the same. 
M. H. Walker Realty Co. v. American 
Surety Co., 60 Utah 435, 211 Pac. 998 
DeLuxe Glass Co. v. Martin, 116 Utah 
444,208 Pac. (2d) 1127 
See also: 
Annotation in 81 A.L.R. 1271 
Grand Lodge etc. United States F. and 
G. Co., 2 Wash. (2d) 561, 98 Pac. (2d) 971. 
Appellant in its brief does not question the above 
stated position of Prudential. 
3. The Contract of July 19, 1950 (Ex. PR-2) 
and the bond which is the subject of this action must 
be construed together. 
Blythe Fargo Co. vs. Free, 46 Utah 234, 
148 Pac. 427 
M. H. Walker Realty Co. v. American 
Surety Co. supra 
DeLuxe Glass Co. v. Martin, supra. 
The rule supporting the above statement is so 
well established in Utah that no comment is neces-
sary other than the above citation of decisions of 
the Supreme Court propounding and applying such 
rule. 
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4. In construing the bond the Court should 
apply the following established rules of interpreta-
tion : 
(a) / / the recitals in a contract are clear and 
the operative part is ambiguous, the recitals govern 
the construction. If the recitals are ambiguous, and 
the operative part is clear, the operative part must 
prevail. 
Shaf f ron v. Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Mills, 
70 Fed. (2d) 963, 94 A.L.R. 543, 547 
Wilson vs. Towers, 55 Fed. (2d) 199, 200 
Moore v. Baasch, 109 Wash. 568, 187 
Pac. 388 
Irwins Bank vs. Trust Company, 195 In-
diana 669, 145 N.E. 869, 146 N.E. 909 
National Bank v. U. S. Trust Co., 184 
Wash. 212, 50 Pac. (2d) 904 
Ross v. Ross, 233 App. Div., 626, 253 
N.Y. Sup. 871 
12 Am. Jur. Contracts, Sec 241, pg. 776. 
The bond, which is the subject of this action, 
contains the following provisions vital in the deter-
mination of this appeal: 
(V) The bond recites that Cassady is 
principal and Hartford is surety and that they 
are "held and firmly bound and obligated unto 
Prudential (called Lender Obligee), unto Felt 
Syndicate (called Owner Obligee), and unto 
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Pacific Coast Title Insurance Company (call-
ed Title Obligee), "as their respective inter-
ests may appear as obligees." 
(2') In the first preamble the contract 
of July 19, 1950, is recited, "which contract 
is by reference incorporated herein and made 
a part hereof." 
In the fifth preamble it is recited as 
follows: "Whereas the Lender Obligee, Title 
Obligee, and Owner Obligee each desire pro-
tection as their interests may appear, in event 
of def aut by the principal under said contract, 
said protection to be subject to the perform-
ance by the Lender Obligee, the Title Obligee 
and the Owner Obligee of their respective 06-
ligations to the principal in connection with 
said contract." (Emphasis supplied) 
(3') The condition of said bond "is 
such that if the principal well and truly per-
forms all the undertakings, covenants, con-
ditions and agreements of said contract on its 
part and fully indemnifies and saves harm-
less the Obligees from all loss, cost, damage 
and expense which they may suffer, either 
jointly and severally, by reason of failure so 
to do, and fully reimburses and repays obli-
gees all outlay and expense which said obligees 
may incur in making good any such default; 
and further, if the principal shall pay all 
persons who have contracted, or will have 
contracted, directly with principal for serv-
ices or labor or materials furnished under 
the provisions of said contract, and shall keep 
and maintain each lot or building site free and 
clear from labor and material liens, then 
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this obligation shall be void; otherwise, it 
shall remain in full force and effect." (Em-
phasis supplied) 
(4') It is provided further in the bond 
as follows: "The Lender Obligee slmll have 
prior right and lien under this bond as 
against the other Obligees herein named" 
And it is further provided: "The surety shall 
not be liable under this bond to the Obligees, 
and either of them, unless the Obligees, or 
either of them, shall make payment to the 
principal in reasonable compliance with the 
terms of said contract as to payments, and 
each shall perform all other obligations to 
be performed by each Obligee under said con-
tract at the time and in the manner therein 
set forth." (Emphasis supplied) 
The foregoing provisions quoted from Contract 
of July 19, 1950 (Ex. PE-2) and the Bond (Ex. 
PR-1) make it clear that Prudential, acting inde-
pendently of Felt and Pacific has the right 
to assert a cause of action in its favor on the bond. 
Prudential is a direct Obligee. The terms of the 
bond in this respect carry out and emphasize the 
fact that Prudential was a third party beneficiary 
under the contract. The bond was written in this 
form in order to protect Prudential as a third party 
beneficiary under the contract. It is further to be 
noted that by an express declaration Prudential 
is given a prior right as against Felt and 
Pacific against the indemnity of the bond. This 
provision specifically eliminates the troublesome 
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question which arises in connection with bonds where 
several obligees having separate and several claims 
as beneficiaries. Obviously a surety is liable only 
for the maximum penal amount of the bond. Un-
less this quoted paragraph were in this bond, the 
three beneficiaries would be compelled to share pro 
rata in the penal amount of the bond. However, 
with this provision in the bond, Prudential has a 
first and prior claim for indemnity. Its claim must 
be satisfied before either Felt or Pacific can claim 
the protection. In this case this question does not 
arise because the penal amount of the bond far ex-
ceeds the claims of Prudential, Felt and Pacific. 
However, the provision is extremely pertinent in 
discovering the contractual intentions of the par-
ties to this bond. 
(b) Surrounding Circumstances: If there is 
an ambiguity in a contract, resort may be had to 
the situation of the parties and the circumstances 
under which it was entered into for the purpose, 
not of changing the writing, but of furnishing light 
to determine the intention of the parties and the 
meaning of the terms they used and when these 
are ascertained they must prevail over the dry words 
of the agreement. 
Walker v. Brown, 165 U. S. 654,41L. Ed. 
865,17 Sup. Ct. 453 
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Kauffman v. Raeder, 108 Fed. (8 Cir.) 
171, 54 LRA 247 
Boley vs. Butterfield, 57 Utah 262, 194 
Pac. 128 
Reed vs. Forced Underfiring Corpora-
tion, 82 Utah 529, 26 Pac. (2d) 323 
Fox Film Corporation vs. Ogden Theater 
Co., 82 Utah 279,17 Pac. (2d) 294, 90 A.L.R. 
1299. 
(c) Attainment of factual results. "When it 
becomes clear that the parties intended to produce 
a certain factual result, interpretation should be 
affected by reasonable and necessary implications, 
so that the legal effect then given to the instrument 
will be such as to attain the intended factual result. 
A court may thus be able to realize the aims and 
purposes of the parties, even though their express 
words would otherwise be interpreted differently 
and would produce different legal effect. This may 
be done without the necessity of any formal decree 
of reformation." 
Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 3, Sec. 545, 
pgs. 90, 91. 
POINT IX 
VIOLATIONS (IF SUCH VIOLATIONS OCCURR-
ED) BY FELT OF ITS CONTRACTS WITH CASSADY 
CANNOT BE IMPUTED TO PRUDENTIAL SO AS TO 
BAR PRUDENTIAL'S RECOVERY AGAINST HART-
FORD ON THE BOND. THE BOND SECURED DIS-
TINCT AND SEPARATE RIGHTS OF THE OBLIGEES. 
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HARTFORD ASSUMED DISTINCT OBLIGATIONS TO 
PRUDENTIAL WHICH DID NOT RUN TO EITHER 
FELT OR PACIFIC AND PRUDENTIAL MAY THERE-
FORE HAVE ITS SEPARATE ACTION FOR THE 
BREACH OF THOSE OBLIGATIONS. HARTFORD CAN- '•) 
NOT DEFEND PRUDENTIAL'S ACTION ON THE 
GROUND THAT THE OTHER OBLIGEES, OR EITHER 1 
OF THEM, VIOLATED THE CONTRACTS WITH CAS-
SADY OR BREACHED CONDITIONS OF THE BOND. 
The foregoing proposition is declaratory of 
Prudential's contention which, being denied by Hart-
ford, created the principal issue in this case. Pru-
dential's theory of the case was adopted by the 
trial Court in its Findings and Judgment. 
There are four propositions which stand out in 
this case so strongly that they defy contradiction: 
1. Cassady failed, neglected and refus-
ed to procure the 100 dwelling houses in 
Morningside Heights to be constructed in ac-
cordance with the plans and specifications ap-
proved by Veterans Administration. (Hart-
ford admits this fact). 
2. Cassady failed, neglected and refused 
to secure from Veterans Administration its 
approval of the construction of such dwelling 
houses. (Hartford admits this fact). 
3. Because the said dwelling houses 
were not constructed in accordance with the 
plans and specifications approved by the Vet-
erans Administration, it refused to guaran-
tee the mortgages owned and held by Pru-
dential. (Hartford admits this fact). 
59 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4. As a result of the refusal of Veter-
ans' Administration to guarantee said mort-
gages, Prudential suffered damages. (Hart-
ford on this appeal has neither questioned 
the amount of damages awarded Prudential 
nor the method of the trial Court in determin-
ing these damages.) 
It is manifest, therefore, that Cassady was 
guilty of violation of the contract dated July 19, 
1950 between Felt and Cassady (Ex. PR-2) perfor-
mance of which by Cassady was guaranteed by Hart-
ford. Since Prudential was a third party benefici-
ary under said contract it had a direct action there-
on against Cassady for its violation thereof and an 
action against Hartford as surety on Cassady's 
bond. The bond itself specifically designated Pru-
dential as an obligee thereof and recognized its 
clear right to claim and sue thereon. 
Prudential, therefore, respectfully but emphati-
cally asserts to the Court that it has affirmatively 
made its case against Hartford and the evidence in 
the action fully supports that conclusion beyond per-
adventure. 
Hartford, therefore, in order to defeat Pru-
dential's claim must rely upon defensive facts, and 
failing therein, Prudential is entitled to recover its 
damages. The principal defences asserted by Hart-
ford may be summarized as follows: 
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(a) Felt was guilty of four separate viola-
tions of its contract with Cassady dated July 19, 
1950 (Ex. PR-2) which would bar recovery of dam-
ages by it against Cassady and Hartford. 
(b) The breaches of contract by Felt are im-
putable to Prudential so as to bar recovery against 
Hartford on the bond of its damages. 
It is important at this stage to take into consi-
deration the status of the case of Felt Syndicate, 
Inc. vs. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, 
designated as Case No. 8736 in this Court. This 
above action together with the action of Pacific 
Coast Title Insurance Company vs. Hartford Acci-
dent and Indemnity Company, designated as Case 
No. 8719 in this Court as well as the subject action 
of Prudential vs. Hartford were consolidated for 
trial. However, separate Findings and Judgment 
were entered in each case. These actions are now 
pending on appeal in this Court. In the action of 
Felt vs. Hartford (No. 8736 supra) the trial Court 
found no substantial breaches by Felt of the Felt-
Cassady contract of July 19, 1950, but reduced pro 
tanto the award recoverable by it on account of an 
alleged assignment of part of its claim made by 
Felt to a third person. It did, however, allow Felt 
to recover from Hartford the balance of the dam-
ages. Felt appealed from the part of the judgment 
which reduced its claim pro tanto by the amount 
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of the alleged assignment. Hartford cross appealed 
from the part of the judgment allowing Felt recov-
ery for the unassigned part of its damages. 
It is obvious that if the Supreme Court affirms 
the judgment in Felt v. Hartford and thereby disal-
lows Hartford's cross-appeal or if the Supreme Court 
not only allows Felt's judgment against Hartford 
to stand but also directs that judgment be entered 
in favor of Felt against Hartford for the pro tanto 
deduction made by the trial Court, then in either 
of said events Hartford's defensive fortification 
in the subject case (Prudential v. Hartford) is en-
tirely demolished. There will be a judicial deter-
mination that Felt was guilty of no substantial 
breach of the Felt-Cassady Contract of July 19, 
1950. Since there was no breach by Felt there was 
no default to impute to Prudential to bar its claim 
against Hartford, and therefore the judgment in 
favor of Prudential must be affirmed. (Prudential 
has hereinbefore demonstrated that there was no 
breach of any of the contracts by it) . 
On the other hand, should the Supreme Court 
reverse the judgment in favor of Felt against Hart-
ford on the ground that Felt was guilty of sub-
stantial breaches of its contracts with Cassady (and 
thereby sustain Hartford's cross-appeal) or if in 
the instant case the Supreme Court should determine 
that Felt was guilty of substantial breaches of its 
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contracts with Cassady, independent of its decision 
in Felt v. Hartford (A situation which is difficult 
to envision in view of the joint trial and the one 
record on appeal), then in such situation Prudential 
insists that such breaches by Felt are not imputable 
to it under the terms of the Felt-Cassady contracts 
and of the bond now sued upon. If such contention 
be sustained the judgment in favor of Prudential 
must be affirmed. 
For the purpose of this discussion, let it be as-
sumed that Felt was guilty of substantial violations 
of the Felt-Cassady contract of July 19, 1950 (Ex. 
PR-2) in the particulars alleged and claimed by 
Hartford. 
Hartford relies upon the "escape" paragraph 
of the bond to support its contention that the de-
faults of Felt are imputable to Prudential so as to 
bar recovery on the bond by the latter. This pro-
vision reads as follows: 
"3. The SURETY shall not be liable 
under this bond to the Obligees and either of 
them, unless the Obligees, or either of them, 
shall make payment to the PRINCIPAL in 
reasonable compliance with the terms of said 
contract as to payments, and each shall per-
form all other obligations to be performed by 
each obligee under said contract at the time 
and in the manner herein set forth." (Em-
phasis supplied) 
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Also of material consideration on this point are 
the recitals of the fifth preamble of the bond: 
"WHEREAS, the LENDER OBLIGEE, 
TITLE OBLIGEE and OWNER OBLIGEE 
each desire protection as their interests may 
appear, in the default of the PRINCIPAL 
under said contract, said protection to be sub-
ject to the performance by the LENDER OB-
LIGEE, the TITLE OBLIGEE and the OWN-
ER OBLIGEE of their respective obligations 
to the PRINCIPAL in connection with said 
contract." 
We are, therefore confronted with the question 
as to how far and with what potency can the con-
tractual violations of Felt be visited unfifer Pru-
dential and Pacific so as to bar either of them from 
recovery on the bond. 
The preambles of the bond summarize the 
functions of the three obligees in the proposed trans-
action and describe these functions in sufficient de-
tail as will inform a court exactly what part of the 
entire transaction each obligee was supposed to per-
form. The fifth preamble above quoted is of par-
ticular importance in interpreting the contract. 
There is the rule of contract law quoted above and 
which is re-stated as follows: 
"If the recitals [in a contract] are clear 
and the operative part is ambiguous, the re-
citals govern the construction. If the recitals 
are ambiguous, and the operative part is 
clear, the operative part must prevail." 
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With this rule to guide us, an examination of 
paragraph 3 of the operative part of the bond above 
quoted is in order. It is suggested that this provi-
sion is open to two constructions: 
(1) That the three obligees jointly and sev-
erally agree to make the payments to Cassady as 
required of Felt by the basic contract, or to see that 
payments are made by Felt as a condition to enforc-
ing the bond. (This is Hartford's theory.) This is 
an absurd construction. Applied to Pacific which is 
not a party to the contract, it is requiring it to do 
something impossible of performance. Pacific has 
no relationship with Felt whereby it could force Felt 
to perform its agreement with Cassady. Further, 
in the alternative, it would require Pacific to pay 
Cassady if Felt did not. The mere statement of this 
situation shows what an absurd situation this con-
struction produces as to Pacific. With respect to 
Prudential, such interpretation requires it really 
to guarantee the payments from Felt to Cassady. 
This makes it an ultra vires contract because a 
Federal savings and loan association is not author-
ized by law or regulations to act as a surety for or 
guarantor of another concern's debts. In fact, the 
Home Loan Bank regulations cry against such in-
terpretation. Further, the second and third pre-
ambles of the bond explain clearly that Prudential 
is a lender of funds to borrowers, who in turn will 
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authorize Prudential to disburse the proceeds of the 
loan to make the payments due Cassady from Felt. 
These recitals clearly define the obligation of Pru-
dential in the premises. They do not even suggest 
that Prudential guarantees that if the mortgage pro-
ceeds are insufficient to make the contract payment 
in full Prudential will make up the deficiency. State-
ed otherwise, such construction requires the wildest 
kind of distortion of the language to make Pruden-
tial a guarantor of the obligations of Felt. 
With respect to the foregoing statement that 
an interpretation of the bond which casts Pruden-
tial in the role of a surety or guarantor of Felt's 
performance of the Felt-Cassady contract of July 
19, 1950 (Ex. PR-2) would result in Prudential 
entering into an ultra vires agreement, attention is 
particularly invited to the fact that Prudential is 
a corporation oMie United States of America. It 
was organized and exists under and by virtue of the 
Home Loan Bank Act (Sec. 1464, Title 12, U.S.C.A.) 
The powers are defined by said Federal Statutes. 
It is not and was not authorized to act as surety 
or guarantor of another's debt. (Felt was not in-
debted to Prudential) (Deep Rock Oil Corporation 
v. Salisbury 130 Fed. (2d) (8th Cir.) 387 Cf: 
Tracy Loan and Trust Co. vs. Merchants Bank, 50 
Utah 196,167 Pac. 353; Zions Savngs Bank & Trust 
Co. vs. Tropic and East Fork Irr. Co., 502 Utah 101, 
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126 Pac. (2d) 1053). This situation calls into op-
eration another well recognized rule of contract in-
terpretation : 
"An agreement capable of an interpreta-
tion which will make it valid or legal will be 
given such interpretation if the agreement 
is ambiguous. Such interpretation is preferred 
to one which renders it invalid. It will not 
be interpreted so as to be invalid unless such 
interpretation is required by the terms of 
the agreement in the light of surrounding 
circumstances." (12 Am. Jur. Contracts—Sec. 
251 Pgs. 793, 794 on this point.) 
A case of particular relevancy on this point is 
Pine River Logging and Imp. Co. vs. United States, 
136 U. S. 279, 46 L. Ed. 1164, 22 Sup. Ct. 920. 
Quoting from 12 Am. Jur. at page 794 the following 
is a fair summary of the relevant holding in this 
case: 
"Contracts with individual Indians for 
the cutting and delivery of a designated quan-
tity of dead and down timber on an Indian 
reservation will not be construed as author-
izing the removing of all timber of that char-
acter on the reservation because such con-
struction was put on the contracts by the par-
ties interested and was approved by the gov-
ernment agent under whose superintendence 
the work under the contracts was done, since 
such construction would be inconsistent with 
the regulations prescribed by the President 
under the authority of an Act of Congress99 
(Emphasis supplied) 
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It is therefore asserted that the bond which 
is the subject of this action will not be given the 
interpretation for which Hartford contends since 
such construction would be inconsistent with Pru-
dential's corporate powers and in violation of the 
Acts of Congress and the Regulations of Home Loan 
Bank thereunder which govern and control Pru-
dential's corporate existence and authority. 
(2) As an alternative interpretation of para-
graph 3 of the operative part of the bond, it is sub-
mitted that the correct construction thereof is that 
as a condition to enforcing the bond each obligee 
must perform its own covenants and promises. By 
this construction each obligee is responsible for its 
own acts and not for the promises or acts of the 
other obligees. It may be supposed Pacific would 
forfeit its right to claim under the bond if it had 
refused to issue the title policies, because there is 
at least an implied promise to do so — "TITLE 
OBLIGEE will issue ATA title insurance policies" 
—although such implication must arise out of the 
recitals of the fourth preamble and not as an af-
firmative covenant. Prudential would lose the right 
to recover on the bond if it had refused to make 
the mortgage loans, but neither Pacific nor Pru-
dential forfeits their respective rights to claim on 
the bond because of the defaults of Felt. 
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With these alternative interpretations — one 
which leads to absurd results (or with respect to 
Prudential involves ultra vires promises) and the 
other which appears to be the reasonable one, it is 
submitted a court will adopt the latter one (2 su-
pra). This conclusion is amplified and reinforced by 
the above quoted fifth preamble of the bond. The ap-
plication of the rule of law above stated (Schaf-
fran v. Mt. Vernon etc. Co., supra) requires that 
this preamble govern the bond. It recites first that 
each of the obligees "desire protection as their in-
terests may appear79 in the default of the Principal 
under said contract, and secondly, the recital con-
tinues that said protection will be subject to a con-
dition. What is that condition? It is this, that: 
Prudential must perform its obligations with re-
spect to Cassady. Pacific must perform its obliga-
tions with respect to Cassady. Felt must perform 
its obligations with respect to Cassady. 
The preamble makes it certain beyond doubt 
that each obligee stands on its own feet. One does 
not guarantee the acts of another. The fact that 
one obligee defaults does not deny recovery to the 
others. With the preamble (recital) clear it con-
trols the operative part, (paragraph 3 supra) for 
the reason that Paragraph 3 of the operative part 
of the bond is ambiguous (i.e. it is subject to the 
two interpretations above indicated), and being 
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ambiguous the recitals of the bond (i.e. the fifth 
preamble) govern the construction of the bond. 
Respondent has previously referred to two well 
known rules governing the construction and in-
terpretation of bonds of compensated sureties. The 
rules are set forth in sub-paragraphs 2 and 3 of 
Point VI of this brief. The first rule is: 
"If a bond is open to two construction, 
one of which will uphold and the other defeat 
the claim of the obligee, that which is most 
favorable to the claim of the obligee will be 
adopted." 
The second rule proclaims that: 
"Bonds of compensated sureties are treat-
ed as insurance contracts and are construed 
most strongly against the insured in case of 
ambiguities or uncertainties." 
There is a third rule as to compensated sure-
ties Which is a corrollary to the two rules above 
stated as follows: 
«* * *
 t j l e m i e j s w e u established * * * 
that a bond will be construed favorable to the 
bonded if such construction is consistent with 
the object for which the bond is issued." 
(Title Guaranty Co. v. Bank of Fulton, 89 
Ark. 471, 117 S.W. 537, 59 L.R.A. (ns) 
676; Wichita v. Home Ct. Co., 151 Kan. 679, 
101 P. 2d 219; Cert, denied 311 U. S. 673, 
85 L. Ed. 436, 61 S. Ct. 49, and authorities 
therein cited) 
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Granting that the bond is ambiguous with re-
spect to the issue here discussed it is submitted that 
the application of the above stated rules would com-
pel the construction here set forth in favor of Pru-
dential. 
Finally, the terms of the "escape" provision 
(being Paragraph 3 of the bond above mentioned) 
in and of itself bears out the construction urged by 
Prudential. This Paragraph relieves Hartford from 
liability unless: 
" 1 . The obligees, or either of them shall 
make payments to principal in reasonable 
compliance with the terms of said contract as 
to payments, and 
2. each [Obligee] shall perform all oth-
er obligations to be performed by said obligee 
under said contract at the time and in the 
manner therein set forth" 
The Felt-Cassady contract of July 19, 1950 
(Ex. PR-2) specifically provides that payments for 
the houses (Par. 22 of contract) shall be paid by 
Felt to the sub-contractors through a bonded dis-
bursing agency (Par. 23 of contract). The contract 
then provides that if Cassady shall perform its 
undertaking to the satisfaction of Veterans Admin-
istration, Federal Housing Administration and Pru-
dential, as the case may be, within the time stipulat-
ed (and time is made of the essence) that Cassady 
shall receive 50% of the net profit in addition to 
compensation for such work as set forth in Par. 23. 
71 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
These provisions must be read in connection 
with Preamble 2 of the bond which recites that the 
Lender Obligees (Prudential) has agreed to loan 
to qualified borrowers upon security of first lien 
mortgages sums of money to be used in construc-
tion of the dwelling houses and the provision of 
Preamble 5 which recites that each obligee "desire 
protection as their interests may appear" but sub-
ject to the performance by obligee "of their respec-
tive obligations to the Principal [Cassady]" in con-
nection with said contract (See Sub-paragraph 3 
of Point VIII of this brief). 
It is manifest that by the terms of the Felt-Sas-
sady contract of July 19,1950 (Ex. PR-2) that 
only Felt was under any obligation to Cassady to 
make payments or cause payments to be made to 
Associated Accountants for disbursement to the sub-
contractors, and further that Cassady was to receive 
50% of the net profits only if it performed the con-
tract satisfactorily to Veterans Administration, 
Federal Housing Adiministration and Prudential 
as the case may be. Cassady never did earn the ap-
proval of Veterans Administration or of Pruden-
tial (FHA is not involved). It, therefore, never 
earned the right to share in the profits, if any. 
Felt was, therefore, the party under the con-
tract which was charged with the responsibility of 
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making or causing to be made payments for and 
on account of the sub-contractors — not Prudential 
and not Pacific. However, under the provision of the 
"escape" paragraph of the bond, either Prudential 
or Pacific at the election of either might make such 
payments or cause them to be made. Note that the 
provisions of the paragraph recite "that unless the 
Obligees, or either of them shall make the payments 
etc," These words allowed and permitted either Pru-
dential or Pacific to make the payments if Felt did 
not but did not require them to do so. The obliga-
tion was imposed on Felt. The phraseology was in-
tended to allow either Prudential or Pacific to ex-
ercise such right, but there was no compulsion on 
them to do so in order to claim under the bond. This 
conclusion is reinforced by the additional provision 
of the "escape" paragraph that payments should be 
made to Cassady "in reasonable compliance with 
the terms of said contract as to payments" What 
terms of the contract required Prudential or Paci-
fic to make payments? There are none. The duty was 
Felts. 
Of importance is the second provision of the 
"escape" paragraph — "unless each (obligee) shall 
perform all other obligations to be performed by each 
obligee under said contract". There can be no doubt 
that as to obligations other than the payment of 
money, each obligee stood on its own feet — "obliga-
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tions to be performed by each obligee". Here is a 
plain unambiguous recognition that each obligee in 
order to claim on the bond must perform the obliga-
tion assumed by it above — not the other obligee's 
obligations. It is apparent that Hartford's inter-
pretation of the first condition of the "escape" para-
graph is at variance with the unambiguous declar-
ation of the second provision. The interpretation 
hereby submitted by Prudential brings the two pro-
visions into harmony, and does no violence to the 
language of either provision. All other rules of con-
struction aside, it is submitted that it is the reason-
able and logical interpretation and is wholly consis-
tent with the external facts and circumstances 
shown by the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits to the court 
that it has fully answered all of the contentions of 
the Appellant in its brief and that it has shown that 
the evidence before the trial court was substantial 
and competent to support the findings and conclu-
sions of the trial court. The burden of proof was on 
the Respondent, as the plaintiff in this case, but 
such has been fully discharged. Now the Appellant 
is in a defensive position and charged with the 
duty of showing to the court that the findings of 
the trial court are not supported by competent and 
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substantial evidence, and that the conclusions and 
judgment are contrary to law. The admissions of 
Appellant, as referred to above in the brief, make 
it clear that it is in a defensive position. These ad-
missions virtually made the case for Respondent. 
Unless Appellant can convince the Honorable court 
that its defenses are sustained not only by substan-
tial competent evidence, but by appropriate rules 
of law, the judgment in favor of Prudential must 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANKLIN RITER and 
HARRY D. PUGSLEY 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Prudential Federal Savings & 
Loan Association 
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